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THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT THEORY 
Randy E. Barnett* 
THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW. By Robert A. 
Hillman. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997. Pp. xiv, 
279. $120.50. 
INTRODUCTION: THE GENERATIONAL SHIFT IN 
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP 
When I teach the doctrine of good faith performance, I assign 
an exchange between two distinguished contracts scholars, Robert 
Summers and Steven Burton, that has come to be known as the 
"Summers-Burton" debate.1 This debate is interesting not only for 
the contrasting views of its protagonists concerning the doctrine of 
good faith, but also because of the generational shift in modes of 
scholarship it represents. 
, 
In the 1950s and 1960s, contracts scholars, like so many others, 
rejected so-called "conceptualist" or "formalist" approaches that 
attempted to dictate the outcome of cases with general concepts 
and rules. Contracts scholarship was dominated by supposedly "re­
alist" inquiries into the complexities of actual commercial practice, 
inquiries which sought to identify the multiple factors or considera­
tions that judges do or should take into account when deciding 
cases. Usually it was denied that these factors could or should be 
weighted or organized in some manner in advance of a legal dis­
pute. Any effort to reduce the vast complexity of the real world of 
commercial practice to some verbal formula was dismissed as "re­
ductionist" or "simplistic." 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "reductionist" as: "An 
advocate of reductionism; one who attempts to analyse or account 
for a complex theory or phenomenon by reduction."2 And it de­
fines "simplistic" as: "Of the nature of, or characterized by, (ex­
treme) simplicity. Now usu[ally] with the connotation of excessive 
or misleading simplification."3 An 1881 example of the word's us­
age captures the "realist" spirit that eventually captured the imagi-
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1974, 
Northwestern; J.D. 1977, Harvard. rbarnett@bu.edu - Ed. 
1. See RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES oN CoNTRAcr LAW 250-67 (1995). 
2. 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 437 (2d ed. 1989). 
3. 15 id. at 501. 
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nation of legal scholars: "The facts of nature and of life are more 
apt to be complex than simple. Simplistic theories are generally 
one-sided and partial."4 
Professor Summers is of the generation of legal academics that 
was taught by the vanguard of "realisf' professors - a generation 
that took their teachers' gestalt and terminology to heart. For ex­
ample, to explain the implied duty of good faith performance in his 
seminal 1968 article, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the 
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 Summers pro­
posed a series of six categories of bad faith performance: (a) eva­
sion of the spirit of the deal, (b) lack of diligence and slacking off, 
(c) willfully rendering only "substantial performance," (d) abuse of 
a power to specify contract terms, ( e) abuse of a power to deter­
mine compliance, and (f) interfering with or failing to cooperate in 
the other party's performance.6 In terms that embody the spirit of 
the realist generation (and of those whom the realists taught), Sum­
mers explicitly denied that any more general conception of good 
faith was helpful or even possible: 
It is submitted that any but the most vacuous general definition of 
good faith will . . .  fail to cover all the many and varied specific mean­
ings that it is possible to assign to the phrase in light of the many and 
varied forms of bad faith recognized in the cases . . . .  
. . . [G]eneral definitions of good faith either spiral into the Cha­
rybdis of vacuous generality or collide with the Scylla of restrictive 
specificity .7 
A judge, he advised, "should not waste effort formulating his own 
reductionist definitions. Instead, he should characterize with care 
the particular forms of bad faith he chooses to rule out . . . .  "8 
In the 1970s and 1980s, this attitude .toward scholarship began to 
change. Legal scholarship shifted away from realist modes toward 
what came to be called "legal theory." Contracts scholarship, like 
other fields, came to be dominated by scholars who risked the epi­
thets of '�reductionist" and "simplistic" in search of unifying theo­
ries of legal doctrine. For reasons I have elaborated elsewhere,9 I 
attribute this generational shift initially to the rise of law and eco­
nomics - which directly responded to the consequentialist or "pol-
4. Id. 
5. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968). 
6. See id. at 232-43. In this same article, Summers also provides five circumstances indi­
cating "bad faith in the negotiation and formation of contracts," id. at 220-32, three instances 
involving "bad faith in raising and resolving contract disputes," id. at 243-48, and four forms 
of "bad faith in taking remedial action," id. at 248-52. 
7. Id. at 206. 
8. Id. at 207. 
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 
97 HAR.v. L. REv. 1223 (1984) (book review). 
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icy" concerns of the realists - and to the subsequent emergence of 
normative legal philosophy that sought to trump the "conservative" 
conclusions of efficiency theorists that many "progressive" legal 
scholars found unpalatable. As a result, scholarship like Robert 
Summers's realist lists of multiple factors that judges, in their dis­
cretion, needed to take "into account," began to give way to more 
systematic theories and approaches. 
One of these was a comprehensive theory of good faith per­
formance developed by Steven Burton, which he presented in his 
1980 article, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per­
form in Good Faith.10 According to Burton, the problem of good 
faith performance arises when a contract gives one party a degree 
of discretion in performing, and this discretion is then used by that 
party to recapture an opportunity foregone at contract formation. 
So to determine whether a party has acted in bad faith, one must 
identify both an opportunity objectively foregone and a subjective 
intention to recapture it. 
Burton contended that without "an operational standard that 
distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith perform­
ance, "11 the general requirement of good faith as contained in the 
Uniform Commercial Code "appears as a license for the exercise of 
judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable 
and inconsistent applications."12 And he specifically took issue 
with Summers's "list of factors" approach: "No effort is made to 
develop a unifying theory that explains what these categories have 
in common. Indeed, the assertion is made that one cannot or 
should not do so."13 In contrast, Burton argued that "[r]epeated 
common law adjudication, however, has enriched the concept of 
good faith performance so that an operational standard now can be 
articulated and evaluated."14 Burton's theory was based on "a sur­
vey of over 400 cases in which courts explicitly refer to good faith in 
performance,"15 but also on a basic low-tech efficiency analysis.16 
Summers did not remain silent in the face of this challenge, and 
his response was methodological as much as it was substantive: 
My view is that all such efforts to define good faith, for purposes of a 
section like 205, are misguided. Such formulations provide little, if 
10. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; see also Steven 
J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 67 lowA L. REv. 1 (1981). 
11. Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 10, at 369. 
12. Id. at 369-70 (footnote omitted). 
13. Id. at 369 n.5. 
14. Id. at 370 (footnote omitted). 
15. Id. at 380 n.45. 
16. See id. at 392-94. 
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any, genuine definitional guidance. Moreover, some of them may re­
strictively distort the scope of the general requirement of good 
faith . . . .  Finally, the very idea of good faith, if I am right, is simply 
not the kind of idea that is susceptible of such a definitional 
approach.17 
Substantively, he argued that Burton's two-part inquiry was not 
helpful to deciding cases, that it did not focus on the right things, 
and that it did not go far enough.ls 
Burton responded with a thoughtful, and I think persuasive, re­
ply to Summers's critique, in which he characterized the difference 
in their methodologies - the difference that I am calling 
generational: 
We want our language to call our attention to the facts that matter -
those that legitimately establish similarities with or significant differ­
ences from the precedents. . . . We want to know which facts shall 
count for more than their truth because they are legally significant. 
Language can perform this function in a number of ways in addi­
tion to 'positive definitions.' Professor Summers' preference for "lists 
of factors generally relevant to the determination" favors one form 
that could be employed, in theory . . . . A second form that could be 
employed, however, is the general description or model - a simpli­
fied representation of a complex reality . . . .  Unlike most lists of fac­
tors, the general description technique encourages us to focus on 
complex webs of relationships among the facts.19 
Or, in the words of P.J. O'Rourke: "Complexities are fun to talk 
about, but, when it comes to action, simplicities are often more 
effective. "20 
In drawing attention to a generational shift in modes of scholar­
ship, I do not wish to exaggerate it. Not everyone took the tum to 
unifying theory. Most notable among contracts scholars who did 
not are those associated with the Wisconsin Contracts Group21 and 
those who were attracted to relational theory.22 Nevertheless, both 
of these schools of thought grew out of the influence of two scholars 
who were born within four years of Robert Summers at the begin-
17. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith -Its Recognition and Concep· 
tualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 829-30 (1982). 
18. See id. at 830-34. 
19. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to 
Professor Summers, 69 lowA L. REv. 497, 509-10 (1984). 
20. P J. O' RoURKE, EAT THE RICH: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 209 (1998}; cf. RICH­
ARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). 
21. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CoNTRAcrs: LAW IN ACTION (1995). 
22. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 303 (1992}. For a summary and critique of communitarian relational theory, see Randy 
E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 
VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992). 
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ning of the Great Depression: Stewart Macaulay and Ian 
Macneil.23 
Summers has not been without his own influence, particularly 
on his Cornell Law School colleague and casebook coauthor,24 
Robert Hillman. Hillman, a 1972 graduate of Cornell himself, be­
gan teaching in 1975 at the University of Iowa, where Steven 
Burton arrived two years later in 1977. They taught together for 
five years when, in a career move that starkly symbolizes his choice 
of scholarly models, Hillman left Iowa in 198325 to join the faculty 
of Cornell and his mentor Robert Summers. 
I. HILLMAN'S CRITIQUE OF CONTRACT THEORY 
Over the past twenty-five years, Professor Hillman has made 
many valuable contributions to contracts scholarship,26 but early on 
he expressed his discomfort with what he labeled "modem contract 
theory." In 1988, five years after moving from Iowa to Cornell, he 
published an essay, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory,27 in 
which he laid out a general critique of unifying theories, and which 
he has now expanded into a book, The Richness of Contract Law. 
The title of Hillman's book is intended to emphasize the fact 
that contract law is far more complex and "rich" than modem uni­
fying contract theories seem to acknowledge: 
Contract law includes a rich combination of normative· approaches 
and theories of obligation. It is divided by special rules for distinct 
kinds of contracts and is subject to many exceptions and counter­
principles. Despite its many dimensions, contract law is a credible, if 
not flawless, reflection of the values of the surrounding society. A 
highly abstract unitary theory illuminates contract law, but it cannot 
explain the entire sphere. [p. 6] 
Contract law and theory include contradictions and distinctions. Sub­
ject to competing norms and distinct theories of obligation and to var­
ious exceptions within the main body of doctrine, and divided by 
special rules applying to distinct kinds of contracts, contract law does 
not fit neatly into any slot. A highly abstract core theory simply can­
not account for an entire subject. Instead, contract law is a plausible, if 
23. Summers was born in 1933; Macaulay in 1931; and Macneil in 1929. 
24. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CoNTRAcr AND RELATED OBLI­
GATION (2d ed. 1992). 
25. The year after Hillman departed, Eric Anderson joined the Iowa faculty. Anderson's 
subsequent contracts scholarship is clearly in the mold of Steven Burton. See, e.g., Eric An­
derson, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contract, 21 U.C. DA VIS L. REv. 1073 
(1988) (providing a unified theory of material breach). 
26. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: Analysis 
Under Modem Contract Law, 1987 DuKE LJ. 1. I included an excerpt from this article in my 
anthology, Perspectives on Contract Law. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 357-68. 
27. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory, 67 TEXAs L. REv. 103 
(1988). 
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not perfect, reflection of various normative choices of the surrounding 
society. [pp. 273-74; emphasis added, footnotes omitted] 
Throughout the book, Hillman offers a number of useful in­
sights about various issues of contract law and theory - as he has 
in his numerous law review articles - but in this review I shall be 
concerned with his overall theme: a general skepticism about "uni­
fying" or "highly abstract" contract theories that fail to mirror the 
richness of contract law. In this regard, he stands in the "realist" 
tradition of the previous generation of contracts scholars. Hillman 
attempts to justify this stance by examining a number of doctrinal 
contexts: contract formation, unconscionability, and good faith. 
He considers a variety of theoretical approaches: promise theorists, 
reliance theorists, feminist theorists, efficiency theorists, relational 
theorists, and critical legal scholars. 
But though Hillman professes to be concerned with unifying 
contract theories in general, he seems to be primarily troubled by 
theories with which he disagrees. For example, he offers no criti­
cism of feminist theory and, indeed, accepts Mary Joe Frug's char­
acterization of his own analysis as "feminine. "28 After ten pages of 
uncritical summary of contract theories by critical legal scholars, 
Hillman concludes that he finds the "CLS [critical legal studies] in­
determinacy thesis" to be "quite persuasive," though, without elab­
orating, he adds, "[i]n the end, contract law is probably not as 
indeterminate as CLS wants to claim" (p. 209). His critique of rela­
tional theory is similarly tepid, dismissing numerous lengthy pub­
lished criticisms of relationalism, which he dutifully cites,29 with a 
single unsupported sentence: "These criticisms seem to underesti­
mate the judicial capacity to engage in a highly contextual investiga­
tion and to evaluate the relevant relational norms . . . .  " (p. 260) -
though he allows that "one can overstate the conclusions suggested 
by relationalism" (p. 260). 
28. Frug concluded that my approach "neatly fits the popular interpretation of . . . 
virtuous feminine attitudes toward justice" because it "is characterized by a concern for 
multiple objectives, by an appreciation of contextualized relationships, and by a desire to 
achieve flexibility and sharing in the administration of contract remedies." Moreover, 
my analysis "offer[s] a critique of the male model which is both powerful and also remi­
niscent of typical feminine criticisms of masculinity." 
P. 160 (quoting Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist 
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1036, 1037 {1992) {alterations in 
original)). 
29. He cites the following criticisms of relationalism without identifying where any are 
mistaken (p. 259 nn.82-85): MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CON· 
TRACT 141-42 (1994); Barnett, supra note 22, at 1200; Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, 
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERD1sc. L.J. 115, 142 {1992); 
Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 2 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 91, 103, 108, 111 {1993); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in 
Gooo FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 291 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 
1995). 
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This is, unfortunately, a general tendency of this book. Theories 
with which Professor Hillman appears sympathetic are presented 
with little or no criticism beyond footnote citations to the published 
criticisms of others, wher.eas he takes to task those theories with 
which he disagrees. Professor Hillman is, of course, well within his 
rights to agree or disagree with particular theories - in short, to 
take sides in a theoretical debate. But this book purports to be 
about the deficiencies of abstract or general contract theory per se, 
which he formerly had referred to as in a "crisis."30 He attempts to 
claim a higher ground than those locked in "theoretical debate" (p. 
7). If that is truly his thesis, then it is only selectively applied. 
Moreover, just as he neglects the richness of published criticisms 
of theories he likes, he overlooks the richness of contract theories 
with which he disagrees. This is evident in his treatment of the ba­
sis of contractual obligation. There, his rhetorical stance is to rise 
above the debate between Grant Gilmore's "death-of-contract" 
thesis and Charles Fried's theory of "contract-as-promise." 
Hillman's argument is that 
neither school has offered a compelling and definitive theory. 
Although based in part on promissory principles, modem contract 
law is also tempered both within and without its formal structure by 
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, which focus on 
fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on parties' 
actual agreements or promises. Contract law is complex, contradic­
tory, and, ultimately, inconclusive on what the relationship of these 
principles is and should be. Moreover, by ignoring or downplaying 
counter-principles and theories, some theorists camouflage contract's 
complexity and hence disguise its true nature. The theoretical debate 
therefore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non­
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that this is 
all we can and need to know.31 
Throughout the book, Hillman speaks of the complexity of con­
tract law as though anyone with whom he disagrees is unaware of 
this complexity. He does not seem to realize that one function of 
contract theory is to understand and sort out complexity rather than 
merely report it. Another is to assess contending principles and 
"counter-principles and theories" (p. 7), when contract law is "ulti­
mately[] inconclusive on what the relationship of these principles is 
and should be" (p. 7). Still another function is to reshape and im­
prove the law of contract, to move it beyond where it currently re­
sides. Of course, Hillman really does understand all this. His o\vn 
writings attempt these very objectives. This is merely an unfortu-
30. See Hillman, supra note 27. 
31. Pp. 7-8 (footnotes omitted). In support of his claim that "some theorists camouflage 
contract's complexity and hence disguise its true nature," Hillman cites Ian Macneil, of 
whose abstract unifying contract theory Hillman offers no criticism. See p. 7 & n.3. 
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nate posture he assumes when speaking of theories with which he 
disagrees. 
For someone concerned with complexities, however, Hillman 
offers what the "realist" generation might call a simplistic and re­
ductionist presentation of the current state of "modem contract 
theory." Grant Gilmore wrote in 1974 and Charles Fried in 1981. 
Hillman's book was published in 1997, though Chapter One closely 
tracks his 1988 essay. In the intervening sixteen years, many others 
have weighed in on these matters. 
In 1986, for example, I offered a "consent theory" of contractual 
obligation that differs from both Gilmore's and Fried's theories,32 
though being closer to the latter than to the former. Far from ig­
noring the fact that "modem contract law is also tempered both 
within and without its formal structure by principles, such as reli­
ance and unjust enrichment, which focus on fairness and the inter­
dependence of parties" (p. 7), I surveyed the "core concerns of 
contract law"33 - "will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, bargain"34 -
and explained how, while each has merit, "none provides a compre­
hensive theory of contractual obligation."35 What is needed, I sug­
gested, is a "framework that specifies when one of these concerns 
should give way to another."36 I proposed the criterion of mani­
fested intention to be legally bound, or "consent," as the best way to 
reconcile the competing demands of these disparate principles.37 
Since then I have elaborated upon this approach,38 and it has been 
32. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
1022 (1992). 
33. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 271 
(1986). 
34. Id. Later I added "unjust enrichment" to this list. See RANDY E. BARNETI', CoN-
TRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINE 637-38 {1995). 
35. Barnett, supra note 33, at 271. 
36. Id. 
37. For a summary of how "consent to be legally bound" accomplishes this integration, 
see BARNETI', supra note 34, at 651-54. 
38. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & 
POLY. 179 {1986); Randy E. Barnett, . . .  and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDisc. L.J. 
421 {1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 
Soc. PHIL. & PoLY. 62 {1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Con· 
cepts, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 525 {1990); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and 
Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 783 {1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract 
Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987); Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: 
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 445 
(1987). 
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criticized insightfully,39 especially by Richard Craswell.40 While 
nearly all of these articles are cited by Hillman, none are dis­
cussed.41 In writing a book that purports to criticize the endeavor 
of "unifying contract theories," one has an ·obligation to address 
more comprehensively than Hillman does the richness of such theo­
ries, rather than to reduce all of them to either "promise or non­
promissory principles" and cite the existing literature without 
comment. 
True, one could fault, as others have, my attempt to adjudicate 
the claims of these contending principles of core concerns of con­
tract law. But the most important claim that Hillman makes in this 
regard is his denial that any such adjudication is needed. Recall his 
statement: "The theoretical debate therefore diverts the focus from 
the reality that promissory and nonpromissory principles share the 
contract law spotlight, and that is all we can and need to know" (pp. 
7-8; emphasis added, footnotes omitted). While he is in good com­
pany in making such a claim, I think he is wrong. At a minimum, 
we should seek a theoretical reconciliation, if such can be had. 
Ironically, the failure to do so will blind us to the true complexities 
and richness of contract law, as it may have blinded Hillman to the 
complexities of promissory estoppel. 
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE NEED FOR 
CONTRACT THEORY 
Not too long ago, I published a short essay, The Death of Reli­
ance,42 in which I reported the scholarly consensus - including 
such diverse writers as Daniel Farber & John Matheson, Juliet 
Kostritsky, Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, Mary Becker, and Michael 
Kelly43 - that had emerged over the past fifteen years or so, that 
detrimental reliance was not the key to understanding the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. The scholarly literature on that point 
strongly suggested that detrimental reliance was not necessary to a 
promissory estoppel theory; its existence was not alone sufficient to 
support a promissory estoppel theory; and the measure of recovery 
39. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 29, at 121, 184; Peter Benson, Abstract Right and 
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Con­
tract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077, 1111 n.57 (1989); Jean Braucher, Contract Versus 
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 703-
08 (1990). 
40. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 523-28 (1989). For my reply, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 874-97 (1992). 
41. See, e.g., p. 18 n.61 ("For another unitary theory of contract based on consent, see 
Randy E. Barnett [citing Columbia & Vrrginia Law Review articles]."). 
42. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996). 
43. See id. at 522-27 (providing citations). 
1422 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1413 
in promissory estoppel cases was typically the expectation interest, 
not the reliance interest. In sum, those adhering to a "reliance the­
ory" of promissory estoppel were barking up the wrong tree. 
Hillman disagreed. In 1998, he published an article reporting 
his survey of "all of the reported decisions in the United States . . .  
in which promissory estoppel was discussed from July 1, 1994 
through June 30, 1996."44 While he presents many interesting find­
ings about the frequency and success of actions based on promis­
sory estoppel, among them is one that challenges the scholarly 
consensus on promissory estoppel that I had summarized. Contrary 
to the "new consensus," reliance appears to be a definite require­
ment of promissory estoppel cases. The existence of reliance is dis­
cussed in 27 of 29 (93.10%) of those cases in which a promissory 
estoppel action succeeds on the merits and in 32 of 57 (56.14%) of 
those cases in which it survives a motion to dismiss. Where promis­
sory estoppel actions fail, a defect in reliance is discussed in 151 of 
270 (55.93%) of the cases, and a defect in reliance alone is discussed 
in 68 of 270 (25.19%) of the cases.45 
Curiously, while Hillman reports the total numbers of cases in 
which the absence of a promise (129), ambiguity of a promise (28), 
or refusal to accept parol evidence to prove the existence of a 
promise (8), was discussed as a reason for the failure of a promis­
sory estoppel action, he does not provide the percentages of total 
cases these figures represent. And he does not provide the number 
of cases in which the defect in the promise was the only reason 
discussed by the court for the failure of a promissory estoppel 
claim. We can hazard a guess at these figures from his statement in 
a footnote that: "One or more reasons constituting a defect in the 
promise were discussed in half of the cases (135 cases). The court 
failed to discuss a defect in reliance in only 52 of those cases."46 
From this information we might surmise that in 135 (50%) of the 
cases, one or more defects in the promise was discussed as the rea­
son for the failure of a promissory estoppel claim, and in 83 of 270 
(30.74%) of the cases, the failure of a promise was the only reason 
discussed - as compared with the 25.19% of the cases in which a 
failure of reliance is the sole reason for denying recovery. From all 
this Hillman concludes that: "Overall, the picture that emerges is 
that neither promise nor reliance dominates as a judicial reason for 
the failure of promissory estoppel claims. Rather, both elements 
are crucial to recovery."47 
44. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppe/: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CowM. L. R:Ev. 580, 582 (1998). 
45. See id. at 589. 
46. Id. at 599 n.87. 
47. Id. at 599. 
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Hillman's article is truly an important contribution to the prom­
issory estoppel depate, and, for this reason, I have included two 
excerpts from it in the forthcoming edition of my casebook. His 
research shows that previous studies may well have been wrong to 
dismiss reliance as a necessary basis for recovery. On the other 
hand, the data might also mean that the absence of reliance was 
dispositive in only twenty-five percent of the cases in which promis­
sory estoppel claims are denied. That undercuts the previous wis­
dom - still prevalent among most contracts professors - that 
detrimental reliance is the sine qua non of promissory estoppel.48 
This conclusion is also supported by the facts that (a) defects in the 
promise are the only reason provided in 30.74% of the rejected 
promissory estoppel claims, and (b) detrimental reliance is not dis­
cussed at all in 44.07% of the cases in which promissory estoppel 
actions fail. Thus, reliance may well still be dead as the exclusive 
theory of promissory estoppel, which is how many contracts teach­
ers still think of it. 
Moreover, if one distinguishes promissory estoppel as a substi­
tute for consideration (as Williston viewed it) from promissory es­
toppel as a cause of action distinct from breach of contract (as the 
court viewed it in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 49 which many con­
tracts scholars once considered to be the harbinger of the future), 
then Hillman's results favor Williston's theory. To get enforcement 
a plaintiff needs a "promise + something." That "something" could 
be a bargain (consideration), or it could be detrimental reliance 
(promissory estoppel); but, the plaintiff needs a promise in any 
event, and what results is a contract that presumably must still sat­
isfy other contractual requirements, such as definiteness or the 
Statute of Frauds. 
· 
As interesting as what Hillman finds among the cases he stud­
ied, however, is what he may have missed - and why he might 
have missed it. Hillman looked only for discussions of reliance to 
show that, contrary to the "new consensus," its presence is essential 
to promissory estoppel actions. But the problem for advocates of a 
"reliance theory" of promissory estoppel has always been distin­
guishing reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance from unrea­
sonable, unjustified, or unforeseeable reliance, for no contracts 
theorist thinks that any and all detrimental reliance justifies a prom­
issory estoppel claim.50 In other words, in addition to a promise, 
the plaintiff needs "reliance + something" to get a recovery under 
any reliance theory of promissory estoppel. Whatever that "some-
48. For a summary of the previous wisdom, see Barnett, supra note 42, at 518-22. 
49. 133 N.W.2d 267 (WIS. 1965). 
50. See, e.g., R:EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1981) (referring to a "prom­
ise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce" reliance by the promisee). 
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thing" is, it cannot be reliance, which is present in any event. Thus, 
all reliance theories of promissory estoppel require appeal to some 
factor apart from reliance to distinguish enforceable promises 
(which are accompanied by reliance) from unenforceable ones, and 
this is an element that reliance theorists have been unsuccessful in 
identifying. 
For this reason, it would have been helpful if Hillman had ex­
amined the cases in which the presence or absence of reliance was 
discussed, not only to "questionO the 'new consensus' on promis­
sory estoppel,"5 1 but also to see if he could discern the qualities 
other than reliance that made reliance sufficient or insufficient. 
This would have required Hillman to be more sensitive to the nu­
ances of contract theory than he appears to be when he claims in 
The Richness of Contract Law that "[t]he theoretical debate there­
fore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non­
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that is all 
we can and need to know." (pp. 7-8). If that is all we can know so 
be it, but it is hardly all we need to know. 
Fortunately and coincidentally, at the time Hillman was con­
ducting his research, another contracts scholar, Sidney DeLong, 
was conducting a very similar survey of decided promissory estop­
pel cases. In his article, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reli­
ance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 5z 
DeLong surveys "all of the promissory estoppel cases reported in 
1995 and 1996."53 On this basis he, like Hillman, also takes issue 
with part of the "death of reliance" thesis I earlier presented.54 
In particular, he confirms Hillman's principal finding that the 
presence of reliance is indeed a requirement of promissory estop­
pel: "A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness to the contin­
ued vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered 
that a commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground a claim 
under Section 90."55 He also confirms Hillman's claim that both 
reliance and a promise are needed to sustain an action for promis­
sory estoppel: "It is true that in many cases, opinions affirming the 
51. Hillman, supra note 44. 
52. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943. 
53. Id. at 948. 
54. His data "moderately" confirm the claim that the expectation interest, not the reli­
ance interest, is the normal measure of recovery in contracts cases. See id. at 979-81. 
Hillman's data too undercut any claim that the reliance interest is the prevailing measure of 
damages in promissory estoppel cases. The expectation interest is regularly awarded. See 
Hillman, supra note 44, at 601. 
55. DeLong, supra note 52, at 981; see also id. at 984 ("Every single opinion that men­
tioned the matter instead affirmed the Restatement requirement that the plaintiff actually 
rely . . . .  Considered as a group, these holdings lay to rest Farber and Matheson's assessment 
that actual reliance is no longer an element of a claim of promissory estoppel."). 
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necessity for reliance element also involved some other missing ele­
ment. The most common defect was the absence of a clear and 
distinct promise . . . .  "56 And he takes issue with my claim that a 
manifested intention to be legally bound should be sufficient for 
contractual enforcement even in the absence of a bargain or detri­
mental reliance.57 
DeLong's objective was not, however, simply to debunk the 
"new consensus" on promissory estoppel but also to refine existing 
general theories so as to understand better when reliance was suffi­
cient to justify the enforcement of a promise and when it was insuf­
ficient. What he finds is intriguing: Courts appear to make a 
distinction between what DeLong terms "performance reliance" 
and "enforcement reliance." With performance reliance, the 
"promisee relies solely on her estimate of the 1ikelihood that the 
promisor will perform, without any expectation of a legal remedy if 
the reliance is disappointed."58 With enforcement reliance, the 
"promisee relies both on the credibility of the promise and on the 
belief that she will have a legal remedy for some or all of the costs 
of disappointed reliance if the promise is not performed."59 While 
not claiming the existence of a judicial consensus on the matter, he 
does notice the following: 
Many of the opinions reported.in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the 
thesis that, in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a com- . 
mercial promisee must now dexµonstrate not only that her reliance 
was reasonable in light of the likelihood that the promisor would per­
form [that is, performance reliance], but also that she had a reason­
able belief that the promise was legally enforceable when made [that 
is, enforcement reliance]. Excluding those promises that are already 
enforceable under bargain contract theory, this requires that the 
promisor manifest an affirmative intention that the promise be en-
56. Id. at 985-86 (footnote omitted). This passage continues: "Many of the 1995-96 cases, 
however, denied promissory estoppel claims on the sole ground that plaintiff had not demon­
strated actual, detrimental reliance. The absence of actual reliance was decidedly determina­
tive, not merely make-weight, in these cases." Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted). 
57. For Barnett, . . .  the Section 90 promise becomes binding when it is made, regard­
less of the presence or absence of subsequent reliance by the promisee. Because he 
contends that actual reliance should be unnecessary to enforceability under Section 90, 
Barnett's consent theory cannot account for the courts' continuing insistence on actual 
reliance and their refusal to enforce non-bargain promises in its absence. 
Id. at 995. But later, DeLong himself provides a possible answer to this challenge: 
[U]nder Barnett's analysis a person who manifests an intention to be legally bound to 
perform a promise might also expressly or implicitly condition the promisee's power to 
enforce the promise on her actual reliance, or might expressly or implicitly reserve a 
power to rescind the promise at any time before such reliance. 
Id. at 1000. 
58. Id. at 953. The passage continues: "The promisee decides whether and how much to 
rely by assessing the promisor's honesty and reliability, the circumstances bearing on the 
probability of performance and breach, the benefits that reliance followed by performance 
would confer, and the costs that disappointed reliance would impose." Id. 
59. Id. 
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forceable at the time of the promise. As the promise and consent 
theorists insist, the ensuing reliance is reasonable because the promise 
is enforceable, not vice versa. 60 
In sum, "the 1995-96 case sample contains several decisions sug­
gesting that a manifestation of consent to be legally bound may be 
becoming essential to liability under Section 90."61 Moreover some 
"decisions support what might be called the negative half of the 
consent theory of Section 90, which is both traditional and largely 
noncontroversial: one who expresses an intention not to be legally 
bound usually will not be."62 
One way to demonstrate the richness of contract theory and its 
importance to understanding contract law, then, is simply to read 
both Hillman's and DeLong's articles and ask which tells one more 
about contract law. Of course, Hillman can always go back and 
reexamine his data to see if it confirms DeLong's :findings.63 But 
this would only be to demonstrate that knowing "that promissory 
and nonpromissory principles share the contract law spotlight" (p. 
8), was not all he needed to know to understand the richness of 
contract law. 
Another way is to examine Hillman's treatment of promissory 
estoppel.in The Richness of Contract Law. The book contains none 
of the empirical information just discussed, but it is clear that 
Hillman disagreed with those who emphasized promise over reli­
ance before he embarked upon his study. In his chapter "Theories 
of Promissory Estoppel: Reliance and Promise," he takes issue 
with "promise theorists" - in particular, Farber & Matheson64 and 
Yorio & Tuel. He offers one interesting insight in response to Yorio 
& Thel's claim that reliance theory cannot explain the courts' insis­
tence on the existence of a promise:65 "But Section 90 focuses on 
promise-induced reliance because other theories, such as equitable 
estoppel and misrepresentation, already protect injured parties 
60. Id. at 1003. The passage continues: 
Although the promisor's manifestation of intention to be bound is critical to these cases, 
the court's focus is usually on the promisee's actual or presumed understanding of that 
manifestation. Enforcement is denied if the court finds that the promisee was or should 
have been aware that the promise was not intended to create an enforceable obligation. 
Id. 
61. Id. at 994. 
62. Id. at 995. 
63. Hillman notes that "Professor Sydney W. DeLong's impressive study of promissory 
estoppel cases was published too late to be discussed in this Article." Hillman, supra note 44, 
at 581 n.3. 
64. The article he criticizes is Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory 
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 (1985). 
65. See Edward Yorio & Steve Tuel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 
111, 161-62 (1991) ("[R]eliance theory does not explain why in Section 90 cases courts insist 
that there be a promise. If the basis of recovery were harm caused by the defendant's con­
duct, it should not matter whether the conduct constituted a promise." (footnote omitted)). 
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from conduct and statements inducing detrimental reliance. Prom­
issory estoppel plugs the gap in liability by creating liability for 
promise-induced reliance" (p. 68). Mostly, however, he questions 
their interpretation of, or overgeneralization from, the cases they 
discuss - a critique that is considerably less persuasive, as a de­
scriptive matter, than his later empirical study. 
Hillman's need for an enriched theory of promissory estoppel is 
most apparent whenever he moves beyond describing judicial deci­
sions to make normative suggestions for how courts ought to treat 
cases. For example, when discussing the need to distinguish reli­
ance that merits protection from that which does not - the critical 
stumbling block for reliance theories of promissory estoppel - he 
says: "Foreseeability of the reliance seems a reasonable tool for dis­
tinguishing detrimental reliance that should and should not be com­
pensated" (p. 68; emphasis added). No reason for this intuition is 
provided. He says: 
Courts should also consider a promisor's good faith, for example, by 
taking into account the reasons for the broken promise. A court, with 
some justification, may want to punish a bad faith promisor by award­
ing expectation damages. Conversely, if a promisor acted in good 
faith and expectancy damages vastly exceed reliance damages, a court 
may choose the latter. [p. 76; emphases added, footnote omitted] 
No justification for these recommendations is given. He says: 
Courts should evaluate defenses to bargained-for contracts more 
fully, for example, before they subvert them by granting expectancy 
damages under promissory estoppel. A court may conclude that a 
defense has outlived its usefulness and therefore decide the case on 
bargain grounds. Alternatively, a court may validate a contract de­
fense, but conclude that a promisee's reliance also merits some relief. 
[pp. 75-76; emphases added] 
No guidance is offered as to when courts ought to choose one alter­
native or the other. 
To support any of these normative suggestions, Hillman's con­
cluding observation that "reliance theory creates a flexible, evolv­
ing, context-dependent obligation" (p. 77) is simply no substitute 
for a theory of promissory estoppel, such as that provided by 
Sydney DeLong. But it neatly captures the instincts of the "realist" 
generation of contracts scholars who preceded him. 
CONCLUSION: THE BEST LAW SCHOOL SUBJECT 
When I was considering how I would write this review, I had 
decided to begin by making the provocative, and not entirely seri­
ous, claim that contracts was the best subject in which to specialize 
as a law professor. First, there are the merits of contracts scholar­
ship. The signal-to-noise ratio in the contracts literature is extraor­
dinarily high. Contracts scholarship is of uniformly excellent 
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quality; I rarely fail to learn from any article on contract law I read, 
and contract law publications are not too numerous to keep up 
with. There is a lot of long-standing and intricate contract doctrine 
to understand and integrate, so doing contract theory is both hard 
and rewarding. 
Probably because there are so few active contracts scholars at 
the most elite schools, contracts scholars seem to place a very low 
premium on the status or institutional affiliations of other contracts 
scholars.66 Everyone with something to say gets a real hearing. 
Though it is harder to place a contract article in elite journals, this 
also means that contracts scholars are accustomed to finding and 
taking seriously excellent articles in less prestigious journals. More­
over, as the discourse chronicled above suggests, contracts scholars 
take each other's ideas very seriously - testing and probing them 
with vigor. And I think real progress is made over time as a result 
of this scholarly exchange. 
Then there are the advantages of teaching contracts. Contracts 
is a basic first-year course so we get to teach students when they are 
at their most engaged. At many schools, contracts still run through 
a full year, so we can teach it in greater depth than any one­
semester course. Contracts is a course that raises fundamental 
questions of both justice and efficiency. In addition to the great 
debates among legal titans - Langdell, Holmes, Williston, Corbin, 
Cohen, Fuller, Llewellyn, Gilmore, Farnsworth, Macneil, Atiyah, 
Simpson, Horowitz, Fried, and the list goes on and on - there is a 
wonderful history of contract law to learn and teach. And the con­
tracts literature includes more than the usual number of articles 
about the real story behind the classic contracts cases. 
To my great surprise, however, by the time I sat down to write 
the review, I found that I had been preempted by none other than 
Robert Hillman and Robert Summers in an essay entitled The Best 
Law School Subject, 67 in which they claim that "contract law is by 
far the best law school subject to teach and to learn."68 They ask: 
What other subject contains such a wealth of theory, doctrine, and 
substantive reasoning? What other subject focuses so clearly on es­
sential components of economic and other organization in our society, 
66. One of the drawbacks to being a contracts scholar is that the more prestigious the Jaw 
school, the Jess obligation there appears to be to hire contracts scholars to teach first-year 
contracts classes. The prejudice is that contracts is a course that "anyone can teach." While 
this is too bad for anyone seeking to climb the ladder, it helps ensure that, among contracts 
scholars, one's reputation depends less on one's affiliation and more on one's writings than in 
most other subjects. Another drawback is that one rarely gets invited to speak at other law 
schools on contract Jaw topics, as compared with, say, the Ninth Amendment. 
67. Robert A. Hillman & Robert S. Summers, The Best Law School Subject, 21 SEATILE 
U. L. Rev. 735 (1998). This is a reply to a review of their casebook by Sydney DeLong. See 
Sydney W. DeLong, An Agnostic's Bible, 20 SEATILE U. L. Rev. 295 (1997) (book review). 
68. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735. 
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namely private agreements and exchange transactions? What subject 
better exemplifies the power of general theory, the functions and lim­
its of the common law, the rise of statutory law, the interaction of 
rights and remedy, and the role of various legal actors in our system 
(including transactors, lawyers in their various roles, judges, and 
lawmakers)?69 
Moreover they emphasize how much fun it is to teach contracts, in 
part perhaps because "students come to the subject with low expec­
tations. Invariably they are more than pleasantly surprised to see 
how interesting and exciting it is to learn about what promises soci­
ety legally enforces and why."70 
On this issue, then, there is no generational conflict. And I 
would add that, despite our disagreements, having active scholars 
like Robert Hillman with whom to exchange proposals and criti­
cisms makes doing contracts theory both a challenge and a joy. 
69. Id. at 735 (footnote omitted). In his review, DeLong observes that Hillman and 
Summers's casebook "offers no hope of rationalizing the[ ] different principles [of obligation] 
with each other or establishing authoritative ways of deciding cases when the principles come 
into conflict" and characterizes this as "both a strength and a weakness." DeLong, supra 
note 67, at 307. Hillman and Summers respond that they never attempted "to resolve the 
conflicts among the theories in one grand revelation. Indeed, no one has yet formulated a 
satisfactory 'unified field theory of civil obligation' and we doubt that anyone ever will or 
could." Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 737 (quoting DeLong). 
70. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735. 
